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Abstract 
Since the mid-1980s, psychologists and neuroscientists have used brain imaging to test hypotheses 
about human thought processes and their neural instantiation. In just three decades, functional 
neuroimaging has been transformed from a crude clinical tool to a widely used research method for 
understanding the human brain and mind. Such rapidly achieved success is bound to evoke skepticism. A 
degree of skepticism toward new methods and ideas is both inevitable and useful in any field. It is 
especially valuable in a science as young as cognitive neuroscience and its even younger siblings, social 
and affective neuroscience. Healthy skepticism encourages us to check our assumptions, recognize the 
limitations of our methods, and proceed thoughtfully. Skepticism itself, however, also must be examined. 
In this article, I review the most commonly voiced criticisms of functional neuroimaging. In the spirit of 
healthy skepticism, I will critically examine these criticisms themselves. Each contains at least a kernel of 
truth, although I will argue that in some cases the kernel has been overextended in ways that are 
inaccurate or misleading. 
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<ParaStyle:Author>By Martha J. Farah 
<ParaStyle:FirstPara>Since the mid-1980s, psychologists and neuroscientists have used brain 
imaging to test hypotheses about human thought processes and their neural 
instantiation.<cp:Superscript>1<cp:> In just three decades, functional neuroimaging has been 
transformed from a crude clinical tool to a widely used research method for understanding the 
human brain and mind. Such rapidly achieved success is bound to evoke 
skepticism.<ParaStyle:Normal>A degree of skepticism toward new methods and ideas is both 
inevitable and useful in any field. It is especially valuable in a science as young as cognitive 
neuroscience and its even younger siblings of social and affective neuroscience. Healthy 
skepticism encourages us to check our assumptions, recognize the limitations of our methods, 
and proceed thoughtfully. Skepticism itself, however, also must be examined. 
Functional neuroimaging has attracted a substantial amount of skepticism from inside and 
outside the fields of psychology and neuroscience. In this article, I review the most commonly 
voiced criticisms of functional neuroimaging. In the spirit of healthy skepticism, I will critically 
examine these criticisms themselves. Each contains at least a kernel of truth, although I will 
argue that in some cases they have been overextended in ways that are inaccurate or misleading. 
In other cases, the criticisms are valid as presented and deserve the careful attention of imaging 
researchers. The goals of this article are to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable 
criticisms and to identify some general characteristics of the two categories. In this way I hope to 
encourage the fair and realistic evaluation of functional neuroimaging as a scientific method and 
to foster an understanding of imaging’s limitations without “throwing the baby out with the 
bathwater.” 
The criticisms I review here can be grouped into four general categories, although there is a 
degree of overlap among them and many have been combined in the literature despite their 
conceptual distinctness. The first broad category concerns the nonidentity of, or the gap between, 
the neural events being studied and the images that purportedly represent them. 
<ParaStyle:Subhead>Inferential Distance and the Objects of Imaging 
<ParaStyle:FirstParaSub>As Adina Roskies has pointed out, functional brain images are easily 
misunderstood as photographs of brain function.<cp:Superscript>2<cp:> There are, however, 
numerous types of mismatch in the relationship between published functional brain images and 
the brain activity they represent. Two of these mismatches form the basis of many of the 
common criticisms reviewed here. 
<ParaStyle:Normal><ct:BoldItalic>Blood versus brain.<ct:> The signal measured in fMRI, as 
explained by Geoffrey Aguirre in his essay, is a characteristic of blood rather than brain tissue. 
The dependence on hemodynamic proxies for brain activity strikes some commentators as a 
fundamental flaw in the functional neuroimaging enterprise. I offer three examples of this 
critique, from philosophers, a science writer and a psychologist. 
Philosophers Valerie Hardcastle and Matthew Stewart question “the excited hoopla over fMRI 
and other imaging techniques” by pointing out that fMRI informs us about activity only in a 
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relatively large area of brain tissue (on the order of millimeters) and can inform us only at 
relatively long time intervals (on the order of seconds).<cp:Superscript>3<cp:> They suggest that 
this poor spatial and temporal resolution creates an imprecise representation of neural activity 
and write: “This imprecision forecloses the possibility of directly connecting single cell 
activity<0x2014>which operates three to four orders of magnitude smaller and 
faster<0x2014>with larger brain activation patterns. What are we to do? The answer given all 
too often by neuroscientists is to fudge.” 
In a popular book on the brain, Judith Horstman likewise argues that “an fMRI is not a direct 
image of your brain showing mental activity. It’s an image created through indirectly measuring 
the flow of oxygenated blood and then correlating that information to something you are doing 
or thinking at the time, and the blood flow response takes time. So it’s a stretch to say that there 
is cause and effect and to relate this blood surge to a specific activity.”<cp:Superscript>4<cp:> 
Perhaps the strongest statement of concern over the nonequivalence of blood flow and brain 
activity can be found in the writings of psychologist William Uttal, a vocal critic of functional 
neuroimaging research, who recently wrote: “fMRI is as distant as the galvanic skin response or 
pulse rate from cognitive processes.”<cp:Superscript>5<cp:> 
The undeniable truth in these criticisms is that blood flow and oxygenation are not the same as 
brain activity. Blood flow and oxygenation occur at different spatial scales and over different 
time courses than brain activity. More fundamentally, even if we allow for those spatial and 
temporal limitations, there is no guarantee that cerebral blood flow or blood oxygenation will 
correlate precisely or invariably with neural activity. Indeed, despite considerable research on the 
subject, we do not yet know how fMRI corresponds to specific aspects of neural activity, be they 
the summed synaptic activity of small populations of neurons, spiking of neurons, or other 
physiological phenomena.<cp:Superscript>6<cp:> 
But let us put these criticisms in perspective. The concern that fMRI shows us blood oxygenation 
rather than neural activity directly should be weighed alongside the fact that little of what we call 
science involves direct observations of the subject matter of interest. Cosmologists make 
inferences about earlier states of the universe by measuring background microwave radiation. 
Chemists determine the composition of samples by heating or shining light on them and 
measuring emission or absorption spectra. Climate scientists measure tree rings to study climate 
trends over previous centuries. Complaints that functional neuroimages do not “show” brain 
activity appear to be based on a naïve view of science and its methods. Of course, compared to 
the cosmologists’ or chemists’ spectroscopy, we have only a weak grasp on the nature of the 
linkage between fMRI and neural activity. Nevertheless, BOLD fMRI detects a relationship 
between neural activity and oxygenation that is strong enough to make it a useful research tool.  
Nikos Logothetis, an influential voice of caution on the interpretation of fMRI data, has pointed 
out that similar problems regarding indirectness apply to other neuroscience methods: “Electrical 
measurements of brain activity, including invasive techniques with single or multiple electrodes, 
also fall short of affording real answers about network activity. Single-unit recordings and firing 
rates are better suited to the study of cellular properties than of neuronal assemblies, and field 
potentials share much of the ambiguity discussed in the context of the fMRI sign.” He also 
affirms “despite its shortcomings, fMRI is currently the best tool we have for gaining insights 
into brain function.”<cp:Superscript>7<cp:> 
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In sum, it is not the case that inferences based on functional brain imaging are, in the words of 
the critics quoted earlier, “fudges” or “stretches.” There is indeed a “cause and effect” 
relationship between neural activity and blood oxygenation levels, even if the nature of that 
relation is imperfectly understood.  
<ct:BoldItalic>Functional brain images as fabrications.<ct:> Another way in which the 
relation between functional brain images and their objects has been questioned concerns the 
importance of the decisions that researchers must make (described by Geoff Aguirre in his essay) 
regarding what aspects of brain activity to represent and how to represent the selected activity. 
The worry, in this case, is that the images are more researcher inventions than researcher 
observations.  
For example, scientists and nonscientists alike have regarded the use of color-coding with 
suspicion. Writer Michael Shermer states that “Colors exaggerate the effects in the brain . . . The 
coloring is artificial, and the process of coloring the regions is even more 
misleading.”<cp:Superscript>8<cp:> Horstman echoes these criticisms, warning that despite 
significant differences in the colors used, “differences in activity levels are 
tiny.”<cp:Superscript>9<cp:> In an article entitled “Some cautions about jumping on the brain-
scan bandwagon,” psychologist and textbook author Carole Wade warns that “decisions about 
color scales . . . can accentuate or minimize the contrasts among different brains or brain areas. 
Such decisions can affect whether the gorgeous images we see at conferences, in articles and 
textbooks, and in the popular press will be striking, ho-hum<0x2014>or even 
misleading.”<cp:Superscript>10<cp:> 
The element of truth in this criticism is that color-coding is arbitrary. The choice of which color 
represents which numerical value is dictated by both convention and convenience. 
Conventionally, warmer and brighter colors represent higher activation. But is this in some way 
prejudicial? No more so than plotting numerical data on axes where higher numbers appear 
higher on the page. For functional images or for the coordinates on a traditional Cartesian graph, 
one could reverse the scale to remind viewers of the conventional nature of these data 
representations, but the value of doing so seems small compared to the convenience to readers. 
A related criticism concerns the calibration of color scales in images. The criticism is that large 
differences in color can mislead the naïve viewer into thinking that the differences in neural 
activity are also large, whereas, to use Horstman’s word, they are in fact “tiny.” But do these 
efforts at making different levels of brain activation visible make the images, again using 
Horstman’s word, “misleading”? Not at all. Again, the analogy with Cartesian graphs can help. 
Consider the graph of average global temperatures shown in figure 1///. The calibration of the Y-
axis spans less than two degrees Celsius because this makes the relevant relationships among 
data points salient and enables readers to glean an accurate sense of both the variability and the 
trend of the data points. These data could have been plotted on a graph showing a fuller range of 
temperatures<0x2014>for example, the range from lowest to the highest naturally occurring 
temperatures. Doing so would put the data into a different context, which might be useful for 
some purposes, but for most purposes it would be counterproductive; it would simply make the 
relationships of interest hard to see. Similarly, the color scale used for functional brain images 
spans a small range of BOLD signal change in order to maximize the visibility of the distribution 
of relevant activations. 
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Could one fabricate results, in the sense of changing the pattern of activation, by changing color 
scales? It is not possible to boost or minimize the activation of one region by changing scales, 
without boosting or minimizing other equally activated regions. Choices of color scale or 
contrast affect the salience of certain features, but this is equally true of other biological images, 
including micrographs, gels, and western blots.<cp:Superscript>11<cp:> The issues here are not 
unique to brain imaging, nor do they indicate that colored images are inherently or even typically 
deceptive. 
<ParaStyle:Subhead>Metatheoretical Assumptions and Goals of Neuroimaging 
<ParaStyle:FirstParaSub>Scientific theories and methods inevitably influence one another. In the 
case of functional brain imaging, it has been suggested that the method seems particularly 
compatible with certain assumptions about the mind-brain relation and encourages certain types 
of theories while preventing others from being tested. Specifically, functional neuroimaging has 
been criticized for encouraging research aimed merely at localizing psychological functions, for 
being incapable of testing psychological theories, for assuming a modular relation between 
mental and neural systems, and even for assuming a one-to-one correlation between these 
systems. 
<ParaStyle:Normal><ct:BoldItalic>Localization versus explanation.<ct:> Neuroimaging has 
been caricatured as a form of phrenology, with the research goal being simply to associate a 
psychological function with a specific part of the brain. It is easy to see how this 
misunderstanding could occur, given the archetypal functional brain image bearing color 
splotches affixed to various parts of a structural MRI. 
The philosopher Jerry Fodor has suggested that the question of where in the brain a given 
psychological activity occurs is scientifically trivial. He writes, “It isn’t, after all, seriously in 
doubt that talking (or riding a bicycle or building a bridge) depends on things that go on in the 
brain somewhere or other. If the mind happens in space at all, it happens somewhere north of the 
neck. What exactly turns on knowing how far north?”<cp:Superscript>12<cp:> Elsewhere in the 
same essay he explained why our alleged obsession with localization is not just silly but 
wasteful: “Science is expensive . . . If you put your money (which is to say: our money) into the 
elaborate technology required to establish localizations of mental functions by imaging 
techniques, you almost certainly take it out of other kinds of psychological research. Likewise in 
respect of the time and money that is required to train people to do science; graduate students, 
too, are a limited resource.”<cp:Superscript>13<cp:> 
Uttal, whose 2001 book-length critique of neuroimaging was titled <ct:Italic>The New 
Phrenology<ct:>, suggests that the quest to localize psychological functions in the brain is a 
primary, and misguided, goal of neuroimaging research. He notes that “a considerable amount of 
PET and fMRI localization has simply confirmed some things that we have long 
known,”<cp:Superscript>14<cp:> and he contrasts such research with research that actually tries 
to discover “how the brain computes, represents, encodes, or instantiates psychological 
processes.”<cp:Superscript>15<cp:> 
It is hard to disagree with Fodor and Uttal’s observation that localization is, in itself, a 
questionable scientific goal. However, most contemporary neuroimaging research has other 
goals. In the early years of PET and fMRI, each method was used to image processes whose 
brain localizations were already well known on the basis of lesion studies or single cell recording 
in animals. This exercise helped to validate the new methods, testing them in order to see 
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whether they produced the expected localizations. Once these localizations were confirmed, 
confidence in the ability of functional imaging to detect regional brain activity increased. 
Researchers then began to use the method to investigate cases in which it was not known which 
brain areas were likely to be recruited for a given psychological function, as well as to address 
questions that were not primarily questions of localization. Of course, studies of localization for 
localization’s sake are still occasionally published, just as purely descriptive studies with other 
methods can be found in any field of science, but the bulk of functional neuroimaging research in 
the twenty-first century is not motivated by localization per se. 
Further reason to reject the “neophrenology” charge comes from neuroimaging methods that 
exploit other features of activation in addition to location. For example, “adaptation paradigms” 
make use of changes in activity during the course of perception or cognition, specifically the 
diminution in response to a repeated stimulus or operation when the same set of neurons is 
reactivated.<cp:Superscript>16<cp:> This is because neurons “adapt” to stimulation, reacting less 
strongly if they have recently been active.  By carefully choosing and arranging the order of 
stimuli and then measuring the effects of preceding one stimulus with another, it is possible to 
determine the proportion of neurons that the two stimuli activate in common, in effect the 
similarity of neural coding between the stimuli. When one knows the nature of representational 
similarity, ones knows much about the nature of representations.<cp:Superscript>17<cp:> Using 
this approach, researchers have been able to distinguish between viewpoint-dependent 
representations of an environmental location (akin to a photograph taken from a particular 
vantage point) and viewpoint-invariant representations (similar to a map representation of 
location). cp:Superscript>18<cp:>  
Other decidedly nonphrenological methods of analysis take advantage of neuroimaging’s ability 
to give information about the state of the entire brain, which contrasts with the necessarily 
piecewise approach of nonimaging methods such as single cell recording and lesion methods. 
Analyses of functional connectivity reveal which subset of areas show correlated activity, 
suggesting that they are working together.<cp:Superscript>19<cp:> Such analyses pick out 
functional networks of areas, which may change depending on the task conditions, and hence put 
strong constraints on the nature of the organization of cognitive subsystems. 
Localization is also generally beside the point in multivoxel pattern analysis methods, described 
elsewhere in this report by Geoffrey Aguirre. Indeed, the results of such studies can often be 
stated without any reference to anatomical localization. These methods enable researchers to 
detect specific mental states and decode how specific stimuli or events are represented in the 
brain. None of the foregoing uses of neuroimaging fits the description of “neophrenology.”. 
<ct:BoldItalic>Relevance to psychological theory. <ct:>While anatomical location is an 
intrinsic property of neuroimaging data, the use of these data is not confined to the study of 
localization, any more than the use of reaction time, the primary methodology of cognitive 
psychology, is confined to the study of cognitive speed. Both localized activations and response 
latencies are used by researchers to test psychological hypotheses. Some critics acknowledge this 
use of functional imaging but question whether it has been effective as a means of testing 
psychological theories.<cp:Superscript>20<cp:> Like the preceding objections, there is validity to 
one too. Let us consider the sense in which it is valid as well as the sense in which it misses the 
mark. 
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In response to examples of how neuroimaging can confirm or disconfirm psychological theories, 
Max Coltheart has provided alternative explanations of specific findings to show that they are 
not, in fact, decisive.<cp:Superscript>21<cp:> What gets lost in the debate is the fact that  
decisive experiments are not generally possible in psychology, and it would be equally difficult 
to offer examples of traditional cognitive psychology’s success by this 
criterion.<cp:Superscript>22<cp:> The phenomena under study within cognitive psychology and 
neuroscience are too complex, and the associated theories have too many degrees of freedom, to 
hope for decisive single findings. 
A fairer and more realistic question is: Can functional brain imaging contribute to confirming 
psychological hypotheses in roughly the way behavioral studies do? Can functional imaging, 
experiment by experiment, rule out the more straightforward alternative hypotheses and leave 
progressively more complex or strained alternatives in relation to the supported hypothesis? 
Many fruitful research programs answer this question in the affirmative. Different examples of 
issues in cognitive psychology that imaging has <ct:Italic>helped <ct:>to resolve have been 
offered.<cp:Superscript>23<cp:> My own favorite example concerns the relation between mental 
imagery and perception, a long-standing issue in cognitive psychology.<cp:Superscript>24<cp:> 
Does the visual system do “double duty” for perceptual processes and mental images generated 
from memory, or is the system used to generate mental images from memory independent of the 
visual system? Measures of localized brain activity as rudimentary as EEG and SPECT 
imaging,<cp:Superscript>25<cp:>later confirmed with PET and fMRI, ruled out a set of 
alternative explanations that had plagued the behavioral approach to this question, with the 
evidence indicating at least some shared representations.<cp:Superscript>26<cp:> Of course, new 
questions took the place of the original question, for example inquiring more specifically as to 
which visual representations are shared with imagery, but this was progress. Recently, Mara 
Mather and colleagues surveyed a variety of research programs and identified four distinct ways 
in which localized brain activity can be used to test cognitive theories <cp:Superscript>27<cp.   
<ct:BoldItalic>Biasing hypothesis generation.<ct:> It has also been suggested that the use of 
imaging constrains the kinds of theories of mind-brain relations that will be devised and tested. 
The concern is not that functional brain imaging is merely an exercise in localization or that it is 
incapable of testing psychological hypotheses. Rather, the concern is that it directs us to think 
about brain function in the wrong way. First, it invites us to focus on a subset of the relevant 
data. The problem, writes Uttal, is “the mistaken idea that when all lesser peaks are reduced to 
invisibility by arbitrary scaling, the largest remaining peak represents the sole locale of a 
particular cognitive process.” Second, imaging invites us to frame hypotheses “at the wrong 
(macroscopic) level of analysis rather than the (correct) microscopic 
level.”<cp:Superscript>28<cp:> The result is “misdirected attention and effort”: “we are doing 
what we can do when we cannot do what we should do.”<cp:Superscript>29<cp:> 
The kernel of truth here is that early approaches to the design and analysis of functional 
neuroimaging experiments were best suited to studying relatively small numbers of macroscopic 
regions of activation, ignoring questions of representation within areas or complex interactions 
among areas. The method of subtraction (again, see Aguirre), which was first used to show how 
functional brain imaging can illuminate cognitive processes, assumes that a cognitive process A 
will have the same neural instantiation whether it is accompanied by cognitive process B, C, D, 
or E.<cp:Superscript>30<cp:> In this way, the subtraction method assumes fixed, context-
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independent modules. Of course, analytic approaches such as adaptation designs and network 
modeling, discussed earlier, show how fMRI can transcend this limitation. 
As Erik Parens pointed out in the course of the meetings that gave rise to this collection of 
essays, the history of neuroimaging may be not unlike that of behavioral genetics in this regard. 
In the 1980s and 90s, encouraged by the discovery of several examples of rare medical diseases 
that were caused by single genes, some researchers set out to discover single genes responsible 
for common psychiatric illnesses such as depression, schizophrenia, and autism. In effect, these 
behavioral geneticists were also assuming a simple and modular theoretical framework, with 
individual genes responsible for the psychological phenomena of interest. With time and the 
accumulation of research results showing the inadequacy of this assumption, behavioral genetics 
moved to more complex models, in which genes exert their effects on behavior through complex 
networks of interaction with one another and with the environment. It wasn’t the case that the 
gene as a unit of analysis was useless, but that genes had to be seen in still more complex terms. 
Finally, the concern that brain imaging puts scientific blinders on researchers, allowing them to 
see only simple modular systems, is assuaged by the concurrent use of other methods. 
Hypotheses to be tested are selected in part based on research with other methods of 
neuroscience and psychology, and results are interpreted in part based on research with these 
other methods.<cp:Superscript>31<cp:> 
<ct:BoldItalic>Wanton reverse inference.<ct:> If there were a one-to-one relationship 
between brain regions and psychological processes, as assumed in strict modular hypotheses of 
brain function, then it would be easy to infer what psychological processes are under way at any 
given moment simply by observing which brain regions are active. Given that the brain-mind 
relation is far more complex than that, with a single psychological process of interest typically 
engaging multiple regions and a single region typically involved in the implementation of 
multiple psychological processes, inferring a psychological process from an observed brain 
activity is not straightforward. This has not stopped researchers from attempting to make such 
inferences, ignoring the intrinsic ambiguity of a single region or pattern of activation in a single 
experimental context, considered in isolation. 
This type of inference, going from an observation of brain activation to an inference about the 
psychological process that caused it, was called “reverse inference” by Russell Poldrack.  The 
name highlights a difference between this research practice and the more common, and less 
problematic, “forward inference” practice of manipulating psychological process and observing 
resulting brain activation.  <cp:Superscript>32<cp:>  
Although reverse inference has often been criticized, it is not, in itself, invalid. If one has done 
due diligence to ascertain the range of psychological processes that can activate a region under a 
given set of circumstances, then appropriately framed reverse inferences will be possible. 
<cp:Superscript>33<cp:> Unfortunately, it has often been used wantonly, interpreting a pattern of 
activation without knowing, or acknowledging, the variety of psychological processes that could 
produce that pattern. A celebrated example of such wanton reverse inference appeared in a 2007 
<ct:Italic>New York Times <ct:>op-ed written by neuroscientists Marco Iacoboni, Joshua 
Freedman, and Jonas Kaplan during that year’s presidential primaries. They presented their 
findings from an fMRI study of undecided voters viewing still photos and videos of the leading 
candidates. On the basis of activity in anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), known from other studies 
to become active when subjects feel conflicting response tendencies, the authors concluded that 
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voters felt ambivalence toward Hilary Clinton and were “battling unacknowledged impulses to 
like” the candidate.<cp:Superscript>34<cp:>  
Several leading cognitive neuroscientists harshly criticized the op-ed, pointing out numerous 
flaws in the research design and data analysis<cp:Superscript>35<cp:><0x2014>and emphasizing 
the wanton use of reverse inference. The problem with the reverse inference in this case was that 
many other psychological states also activate the ACC. Activity in this area has been elicited by 
processes as diverse as attention to one’s own heartbeat and emotional 
regulation.<cp:Superscript>36<cp:> 
Many of the commercial applications of functional brain imaging involve reverse inference. For 
example, neuromarketing relies on the ability to infer liking and wanting from patterns of brain 
activation.<cp:Superscript>37<cp:> Similarly, the use of functional brain images for diagnosis in 
some for-profit psychiatric clinics is also based on the premise that certain patterns of activation 
can be used to infer the presence of certain disorders or the suitability of certain treatments. 
Brain-based lie detection promises to distinguish true from deceptive responses by determining 
whether a person’s pattern of brain activation when giving a response more closely matches that 
previously associated with true or deceptive responses.<cp:Superscript>38<cp:> In principle, and 
with the right base of evidence, these reverse inferences could lead to valid conclusions of the 
type “there is a 75 percent chance that the subject” either wants the product, or would respond to 
Prozac, or is telling a lie. In most cases, however, the empirical groundwork needed for these 
claims is far from complete. For example, for all we know now, psychological processes other 
than lying could produce the “lying pattern” with high probability.39 [new reference]  
The multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) technique (see Aguirre) is in effect a combination of 
reverse and forward inference approaches. Reverse inferences can be made with confidence only 
when one knows the full range of psychological processes that could produce a given pattern of 
activation under the circumstances of the study. In MVPA studies, forward inference is first 
performed on all of the psychological states that reverse inference will later be used to select 
among. When the time comes for reverse inference, it is in effect a very large multiple-choice 
among the psychological states that were the subject of forward inference. More open-ended uses 
of reverse inference, in situations where one does not know all of the subject’s possible 
psychological states, would require more exhaustive programs of forward inference research to 
have been completed, and might yield an answer of the form ,“state A with probability X, state B 
with probability Y, and so on.” 
As with many of the other concerns reviewed here, unwarranted reverse inference is not unique 
to functional neuroimaging. It will affect any technology in which a specific cause is inferred 
from the presence of an effect that could have resulted from other causes. For example, in the use 
of conventional polygraphy for lie detection, responses can be accompanied by autonomic 
reactions for reasons other than deception. In PSA testing, elevations of the protein prostate-
specific antigen can result from causes other than a growing tumor.<cp:Superscript>40<cp:> In 
sum, the problem with reverse inference is not unique to brain imaging, and reverse inference is 
not inherently problematic. The problem is with making a reverse inference without the relevant 
knowledge from forward inference. 
<ParaStyle:Subhead>Neuroimaging’s Slippery Statistics 
<ParaStyle:FirstParaSub>Virtually all scientific research depends on statistical analysis at some 
critical juncture or other, but functional brain imaging research is particularly dependent on 
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statistics. As described earlier by Aguirre, extensive signal processing and statistical analysis 
intervene between the data acquired from the scanner and the published image. A number of 
criticisms of functional brain imaging have focused on the statistics involved. 
<ParaStyle:Normal><ct:BoldItalic>Statistical inference versus direct observation.<ct:> 
Some criticisms concern the sheer amount of statistical analysis involved in producing a 
functional brain image. The use of statistics involves substituting estimated values for raw data. 
When the very earliest stages of image processing consist of replacing measured signal values 
with estimated values, the result can be viewed as a fabrication, with all the negative 
connotations of that term discussed earlier. 
In addition, the extensive statistical processing involved in neuroimaging offers many 
opportunities to distort scientific evidence and therefore makes some critics suspicious. For 
example, neuropsychologist Carlo Umilta is quoted as saying, “Would coloured images be so 
convincing even if readers knew those images are the result of an elaborate sequence of 
‘cleaning actions,’ each one characterized by a not insignificant error 
probability?”<cp:Superscript>41<cp:> More extreme skepticism comes from neuroscientist 
Steven Rose, commenting on Fodor’s critique of imaging, who wrote that the “images are 
marvelously seductive, but by the time you see them they have been so massaged as to risk being 
thoroughly misleading.”<cp:Superscript>42<cp:> Michael Shermer observes that “Brain images 
are statistical compilations,” and he advises his readers to “keep all [these many stages of data 
analysis] in mind next time you see one of those colorful brain scans. . . . [Such images are] 
“highly misleading.”<cp:Superscript>43<cp:> Even the widely employed and basic statistical 
process of averaging can seem problematic in the context of imaging: Carole Wade offers that 
the “vexing problem of individual differences in brain anatomy,” which may make the 
“uniqueness of fingerprints or facial features seem simple by comparison,” is problematic “when 
scans from a number of individuals are averaged to produce a single 
image.”<cp:Superscript>44<cp:> 
The problem with this criticism is that, while the incorrect use of statistics is indeed misleading, 
there is nothing inherently misleading about using statistics. The idea that each statistical 
operation on data from the scanner is a step away from reality and toward artifice is a 
misunderstanding. The reality of interest is brain function, not the raw data collected by the 
scanner, and most of the statistical analyses used are tools to learn more about that reality. When 
carried out properly, statistical analyses deepen our understanding of the data and the larger 
reality from which they were sampled. This is the whole point of using statistical methods in any 
field, from cognitive neuroscience to demography. In other words, statistical methods are not 
used to mask reality but to <ct:Italic>better approximate it <ct:>based on necessarily limited 
measurements. Like every other aspect of scientific research, statistical analyses can be done 
well or poorly, with objectivity or bias, but the use of statistics per se is not a problem. 
The kernel of truth in the criticisms just discussed is that the extensive use of statistics provides 
equally extensive opportunities for error. Two such errors are reviewed in the next two sections. 
<ct:BoldItalic>Multiple comparisons.<ct:> Functional brain imaging is susceptible to a 
particular kind of statistical problem that can exaggerate the reliability of findings. The problem 
arises because of the enormous number of statistical tests that can be carried out with image data. 
A functional MRI may contain 50,000 voxels (see the essay by Aguirre for  explanation of 
“voxel”), and each of those voxels could be the site of an independent statistical test comparing 
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the value of the BOLD response measured in that small bit of brain between the two conditions 
of the experiment. Statistical tests yield a “significance level,” which is the probability that the 
observed difference between two conditions was due to chance variation alone. Given that 
experiments are designed so that the hypothesis of interest predicts a “real” 
difference<0x02014>a difference, that is, that would be expected any time the experiment was 
run and not just on occasions when it happens by chance<0x2014>one should employ a fairly 
low, and thus stringent, significance level. The conventional cut-off for considering a finding 
reliable or “real” is a probability of less than one in twenty that the difference between conditions 
is due to chance, usually written as “p<0.05.” Of course, researchers feel more confident about 
their conclusions when p<0.01 or p<0.001. 
When significance testing is carried out with brain imaging data, the following problem arises: If 
we test all 50,000 voxels separately, then by chance alone, 2,500 would be expected to cross the 
threshold of significance at the p<0.05 level, and even if we were to use the more conservative 
p<0.001 level, then we would expect 50 to cross the threshold by chance alone. This is known as 
the problem of multiple comparisons, and there is no simple solution to it. For example, if we 
were to consider as activated only those voxels where the difference between conditions achieves 
a significance level of p<0.00001 then we would also be setting the bar too high for most real 
differences to be found, given realistic limits on the power of our experiments to detect effects. 
One vivid demonstration of this problem was published by Craig Bennett and colleagues in an 
article titled “Neural Correlates of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-mortem Atlantic 
Salmon,” in which a dead fish was placed in an MRI scanner and instructed to think about the 
emotions being experienced by people depicted in photographs.<cp:Superscript>45<cp:> Thanks 
to the large number of independent tests carried out on the data, and with the help of some 
entertainingly good luck concerning the location of the spurious differences, the dead salmon’s 
brain was found to have regions engaged in perspective taking at the p<0.001 level of 
significance. 
Statisticians have developed solutions to the problem of multiple comparisons. These include 
limiting the so-called family-wise error rate and false discovery rate, both of which were tried by 
Bennett and colleagues and which resulted in a finding of no activation in the dead salmon’s 
brain (this part of their article received less attention than the part reporting perspective taking 
activity in the dead salmon’s brain.) Another legitimate tack around this problem is the use of a 
priori regions of interest<0x2014>that is, to simply limit the number of comparisons by 
specifying in advance the regions relevant to the research hypothesis. Still other methods include 
reduction of the number of independent tests, in light of the dependence among voxels, and 
permutation analyses.<cp:Superscript>46<cp:> In short, functional neuroimaging research is not 
doomed to produce spurious results because of the problem of multiple comparisons. Most 
neuroimaging articles from the last decade avoid the error highlighted by the dead salmon study, 
but not all do, which is why Bennett and colleagues published their study. Finally, problem of 
multiple comparisons is not unique to neuroimaging. For example, epidemiology has its own 
reductio ad absurdum demonstration of the need to properly manage multiple comparisons, 
analogous to the dead fish study: A study relating health to astrological 
signs.<cp:Superscript>47<cp:> 
<ct:BoldItalic>Circularity.<ct:> A related problem was pointed out by Ed Vul and colleagues 
in a paper titled “Puzzlingly High Correlations in fMRI Studies of Emotion, Personality, and 
7/29/2013	  
11	  
	  
Social Cognition,”<cp:Superscript>48<cp:> which was widely discussed online and in the print 
media under its original and more pointed title, “Voodoo Correlations in Social 
Neuroscience.”<cp:Superscript>49<cp:>These critics identified a circularity in the way some 
published findings had been analyzed. Some researchers first identified the voxels most activated 
by their experimental task, and then<0x2014>with the same data set<0x2014>carried out 
analyses only on those voxels to estimate the strength of the effect. (They first identified highly 
activated voxels and then went back to test them again, this time leaving behind an analysis of 
the voxels that were not highly activated the first time around.) 
Just as differences due to chance alone inflate the uncorrected significance levels in the dead fish 
experiment, differences due to chance alone contribute to the choice of voxels selected for the 
second analysis step. The result is that the second round of analyses is performed on data that 
have been “enriched” by the addition of chance effects that are consistent with the hypothesis 
being tested. In their survey of the social neuroscience literature, Vul and colleagues found many 
articles reporting significant and sizeable correlations with proper analyses, but they also found a 
large number of articles with circular methods that inflated the correlation values and 
accompanying significance levels. 
As with the problem of multiple comparisons, the problem of circularity is not unique to 
functional neuroimaging. In the words of Vul and Harold Pashler, “Variants of this problem 
seem to arise in every field that takes on the considerable challenge of identifying and 
quantifying signals found in massively multivariate data, where one cannot ascertain in advance 
where the signals of interest may lie.”<cp:Superscript>50<cp:> They cite psychometrics, 
epidemiology, genetics, and finance as examples of fields in which circular analyses have 
distorted the results of research. 
<ParaStyle:Subhead>The Undue Influence of Brain Images 
<ParaStyle:FirstParaSub>Functional neuroimaging has also been criticized as unduly persuasive 
or appealing. Although this criticism is aimed at the lay public’s lack of scientific literacy rather 
than at imaging per se, it figures in many of the criticisms of neuroimaging cited earlier. Recall 
the earlier references to images as “colorful,” “gorgeous,” and “convincing.” Two worries in 
particular have been prominent: that images are too convincing and that they are too appealing. 
<ParaStyle:Normal><ct:BoldItalic>Overly convincing.<ct:> Matthew Crawford refers to brain 
imaging as “that fast-acting solvent of critical faculties,”<cp:Superscript>51<cp:> and Steven 
Poole writes that brain images, “like religious icons, inspire uncritical 
devotion.”<cp:Superscript>52<cp:> Others have expressed concern about the persuasive power 
of images in applied contexts. One group of researchers, for example, has noted the social harms 
that could ensue from “the mistaken impression that fMRI, in particular, is an infallible mind-
reading technique that can be used to establish guilt or innocence, infer ‘true intentions,’ detect 
lies, or establish competency to drive, vote, or consent to marriage.”<cp:Superscript>53<cp:> 
Others warn of “the potential for brain scan images to create biases in the laboratory, the clinic 
and the courtroom.”<cp:Superscript>54<cp:> 
Evidence of the outsized persuasive power of brain imaging was obtained by David McCabe and 
Alan Castel, who assessed the effects of functional brain images on perceptions of the quality of 
cognitive neuroscience research. Using both fictional research descriptions and a real BBC 
science news article, they documented higher ratings of credibility when the texts were 
accompanied by functional brain images compared to bar charts or topographical maps of scalp-
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recorded EEG.<cp:Superscript>55<cp:> Although heavily cited in the years since it was 
published, the findings have not been replicated, and indeed the recent failure to replicate them at 
four different laboratories casts doubt on the phenomenon.<cp:Superscript>56<cp:>	  
Studies of the role of brain images in legal decision-making have also failed to demonstrate 
special influence. Mock jurors in one study were more likely to render a verdict of “not guilty by 
reason of insanity” if defendants had a prior history of psychiatric disorder or neurological 
damage and the jury was shown brain images.<cp:Superscript>57<cp:> However, the brain 
images were always accompanied by additional written testimony in this study, so the influential 
factor may have been the testimony, and not the brain images per se. Another study, assessing 
the effects of various types of lie detection evidence, found that participants rendered more guilty 
verdicts when fMRI evidence was described than when polygraphs, thermal face imaging, or no 
lie detection method were described (although the effect disappeared when the lie detection 
methods were criticized in a cross examination).<cp:Superscript>58<cp:> Note that in this case, 
brain images were not shown and the information associated with the lie detection conditions 
differed (for example, activation of frontal lobes for fMRI, rise in facial temperature for thermal 
imaging). The finding speaks to jurors’ views of neuroscience evidence, but its relevance to brain 
images more specifically remains unclear. Two other recent studies of juror decision-making and 
brain images offer additional evidence,<cp:Superscript>59<cp:> although neither study found an 
effect of brain images over and above information delivered verbally. 
<ct:BoldItalic>Overly appealing.<ct:> Even if brain images do not routinely persuade viewers 
of conclusions they might otherwise question, some have worried that brain images are so 
attractive or fascinating that they garner more than their fair share of attention and resources and 
so crowd out other, more worthy science. As Paul Bloom put it, “Psychologists can be heard 
grousing that the only way to publish in <ct:Italic>Science <ct:>or <ct:Italic>Nature <ct:>is with 
pretty color pictures of the brain. The media, critical funding decisions, precious column inches, 
tenure posts, science credibility and the popular imagination have all been influenced by fMRI’s 
seductive but deceptive grasp on our attentions.”<cp:Superscript>60<cp:> 
Little evidence has been brought to bear on this claim, however. In one experiment, brain images 
led laypersons to rate newspaper-style research descriptions as being more interesting, compared 
to descriptions accompanied by photographs, but brain images have not been found to perform 
better than photographs at making the descriptions seem more worthy of 
funding.<cp:Superscript>61<cp:> 
In sum, although brain imaging seems to lack the dangerous allure attributed to it by some 
critics, neuroscience more generally may command credibility and interest, possibly more than is 
warranted under some circumstances.<cp:Superscript>62<cp:> This is not unique to 
neuroscience.  For example, the presence of equations also enhances evaluations of scientific 
work.<cp:Superscript>63<cp:> 
<ParaStyle:Subhead>The Baby and the Bathwater 
<ParaStyle:FirstParaSub>Functional brain imaging has been subject to many criticisms in its 
first two decades as a method of psychology research, summarized in Table 1. This is 
appropriate, given how thoroughly the use of imaging has transformed the field of psychology. 
As functional brain imaging is taken up by various applied disciplines outside of psychology 
research<0x2014>for example, clinical psychiatry diagnosis or lie detection in legal and other 
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contexts<0x2014>the stakes grow even higher. Inferences based on functional brain imaging, 
whether for basic science or applications, require scrutiny. 
<ParaStyle:Normal> 
As we apply such scrutiny, it is important to distinguish between specific criticisms of particular 
applications or specific studies and wholesale criticisms of the entire enterprise of functional 
neuroimaging. In the first category are criticisms aimed at improving the ways in which imaging 
experiments are designed and the ways in which their results are interpreted. Uncontrolled 
multiple comparisons, circular analyses and unconstrained reverse inferences are serious 
problems that undermine the inferences made from brain imaging data. Although the majority of 
research is not compromised by any of these errors, a substantial minority of published research 
is, making such criticisms both valid and useful. 
In contrast, the more sweeping criticisms of functional imaging concern the method itself, and 
therefore cast doubt on the conclusions of any research carried out with imaging, no matter how 
well designed and carefully executed. These more wholesale criticisms invoke the hemodynamic 
nature of the signal being measured, the association of neuroimaging with modular theories of 
the mind, the statistical nature of brain images, and the color schemes used to make those images 
seductively alluring. As mentioned earlier, each of these criticisms contains an element of truth, 
but overextends that element to mistakenly cast doubt on the validity or utility of functional 
neuroimaging research as a whole. None of the criticisms reviewed here constitute reasons to 
reject or even drastically curtail the use of neuroimaging. Rather, they remind us that 
neuroimaging, like other scientific methods, is subject to various specific errors that the self-
correcting process of science continues to address. 
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